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The Iran-Iraq conflict at its present state has become a war of attrition 
with neither side capable of achieving a decisive military victory over the 
other in the short term. U.S. policy concerns currently are threefold: 
first, that Iraq, despite moves to sustain its economic and military 
capacities, ultimately might suffer a destabilizing defeat to the detriment 
of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region; second, that future instability 
in Iran could open opportunities for Soviet exploitation; and third, that the 
conflict might expand beyond its present confines to threaten friendly 
regional states and the availability of their vast petroleum resources. As 
international efforts at mediation between the combatants continue to 
founder, these concerns raise policy questions of marked interest for the 
Congress. To date, the United States has maintained an official neutral 
stance in the war. Since 1983, the Administration overtly moved toward 
closer relations with Iraq, thereby generating debate over the potential 
effects of a policy "tilt" upon shorter- and longer-tern U.S. interests in 
the Gulf. Congressional inquiries resulting from revelations in November 
1986 of secret U.S. arms Sales to Iran, however, suggest that a U.S. policy 
reappraisal toward Iran had begun in late 1984, thereby raising questions 
regarding U.S. COnsi~tenCy and credibility in the region. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
I. U.S. Interests and Policy Options 
A. Introduction. For the United States, the political, economic and 
strategic significance of the Persian Gulf, located half the globe from 
American shores, derives primarily from the region's petroleum resources 
(more than half the world's proven crude oil reserves). The region is also 
of importance as a key strategic crossroads, and because of its major 
commercial relations with the United States and its allies. 
- 
Fundamental U.S. interests in the Gulf include: continued assured access 
to the region's oil resources for the Western industrialized countries and 
Japan; maintenance of regional stability and the territorial and politicai 
integrity of littoral states; continued use of the region's communications, 
land, sea and air routes, and transit facilities; maintenance and 
strengthening of economic ties with regional states; and prevention of the 
establishment by an external adversary power -- in particular, the Soviet 
Union -- of a predominant political or military presence in the region. An 
associated interest, stemming from the U.S. commitment to Israel's survival, 
is seeking support from regional states for a basic American policy goal of 
resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict which affects virtually every issue of 
major U.S. concern in the Middle East. 
B. Iran. The United States has a continuing interest in the maintenance 
of Iran's territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty as a strategic buffer 
between the Soviet Union and the Gulf. Geographically and demographically, 
Iran retains a natural preeminence in the Gulf region. Strategically, the 
country dominates the northern approaches to the Middle East. Iran's size, 
location, vulnerability and common border with the. Soviet Union give it 
significance in superpower competition. Direct or indirect extension of 
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Soviet influence or Control over Iran would constitute a major threat to the 
security of the Gulf region and its enormous petroleum resources. Future 
instability in Iran could lead to national disintegration, thereby opening 
opportunities for an upsurge in Soviet influence or the establishment of a 
pro-Soviet client regime, with even the potential for Soviet invasion. 
The United States also has an interest in preventing Iranian Islamic 
revolutionary or military expansionism in the Gulf region. An Iranian 
whegemony'p over the Gulf oil-producing states could decisively change the 
world oil market. This interest in containing a strengthening of Iran's 
regional position in many respects conflicts with the U.S. interest in an 
Iran sufficiently strong to resist Soviet power and control and to oppose, 
for its own Islamic revolutionary reasons, the expansion of Soviet power 
southwards. Iranian Islamic expansionism carries the potential for 
destabilizing the Gulf region, jeopardizing oil supplies, lines of 
communication and friendly Arab governments. These two, sometimes 
contradictory, interests would suggest, therefore, a careful balance between 
Soviet-Iranian and Iranian-Arab problems in U.S. policy decisions. 
C. Iraq. . The preservation of Iraq's sovereignty is currently in the U.S. 
interest. Iraq occupies a strategic position in the region, bordering on -- 
in addition to Iran -- Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Some 
observers consider that Iraq is important to short-term U.S. interests in 
that it protects the vulnerable oil-producing Gulf Arab states from Iranian 
military power and coercion and restrains Iranian subversive ambitions.. The 
installation of a Shi'ite revolutionary government in Baghdad, should Iraq 
collapse, would raise the potential for the formation of an Iranian-Syrian 
axis which would threaten not only the Gulf region but also Israel, Jordan 
and Lebanon and U.S. interests in the Eastern Keaiterranean. 
D. Gulf Stability. The United States and its allies possess an important 
interest in stability in the Gulf region. Successful mediation efforts 
culminating in a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement to the conflict 
between Iran and Iraq would appear to be compatible with this interest. An 
escalation of the Iran-Iraq war, whether initiated by either side, raises the 
distinct possibility for wider involvement, both regional and external, that 
would without doubt affect the region's oil production, prices and exports. 
Such a crisis could engender superpower confrontation- 
E. U.S. Policy Options: To Tilt or Not To Tilt? From the beginning of 
the conflict, there has been considerable debate over U.S. policy toward Iran 
and Iraq. Some observers have contended that the U.S. course of neutrality 
has rendered U.S. policy on the war impotent. They reportedly called for 
options that would "tilt" the United States toward Iraq. Others have 
perceived that, should Iraq seriously damage Iran's oil export capabilities, 
Iran will likely respond with actions that could widen the conflict. Thus, 
it is essential, in this view, that regional countries and other interested 
parties make a concerted effort to bring pressure on the two belligerents to 
exercise restraint. Should there be an escalation of the war, the entire 
Gulf could become embroiled with obvious regional and worldwide implications, 
including spillover effects on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Western 
economies, and the potential for superpower confrontation. 
Those favoring a "tilt" in U.S. policy toward Iraq have considered that 
the short-term interests of the United States and its allies would be served 
by helping preserve Iraq's sovereignty and preventing the installation of a 
Shi'ite revolutionary government in Baghdad. The United States can assist in 
the prevention of an Iraqi economic collapse through the .export of U.S. 
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technological expertise and services, and by loans and guarantees, including 
the Export-Import Bank. They argued that Iraq strategically is important to 
these interests in that it protects the vulnerable Gulf oil-producing states 
from Iranian military power and restrains Iranian subversive ambitions. 
Others assert the United States should assist Iraq through non-lethal means, 
including satellite intelligence data. Should Iraq collapse, wider U.S. 
interests in the Middle East would be threatened. 
The advocates of a "tilt" toward Iraq have pointed to the prevailing trend 
that, over the long term, a war of attrition favors Iran and that Ayatollah 
Khomeini will never negotiate a settlement until Iraq collapses. They 
contend that the United States needs Iraq for leverage against Syria; if Iraq 
collapses, and a Syrian-Iranian axis is formed, Syria will achieve new 
regional predominance, thereby increasing Soviet influence. Iraq, since 
1975, has distanced itself from its formerly close relations with the Soviet 
Union; despite recent increases in Soviet military supplies, Baghdad 
maintains its independence from possible Soviet leverage. With respect to 
U.S. policy goals in the Middle East, Iraq has indicated its acceptance of 
Israel's right to exist and has expelled the Abu Nidal faction. Iran, on the 
other hand is lending support to terrorism through training, financing and 
equipping various groups, and Tehran is suspected for its complicity in the 
bombings in Lebanon and Kuwait and other incidents of terrorism, including 
hostage-taking. The Khomeini regime's human rights record is atrocious. The 
greatest danger facing Iraq is economic strangulation and, so long as 
Khomeini remains in power, the war of attrition is likely to be unrelenting. 
The United States and its allies should at all costs prevent Iranian success. 
Restorian of diplomatic ties with Baghdad in November 1984 would seem to have 
underscored this determination. 
Those critical of an Iraqi option reportedly have contended that such a 
"tilt" toward Iraq serves no useful purpose. They consider that Iran, in the 
longer-term, is of greater strategic importance to U.S. interests and 
outweighs other short-term considerations. While there are few expectations 
for any improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations so long as the current Tehran 
regime retains power, a "tilt" toward Iraq tends to &iscourage longer-term 
moderation in, and future ties with, Iran. Iran remains the strategic buffer 
between the Soviet Union and the Gulf; closer U.S. relations with Iraq would 
tend to draw Iran nearer to the Soviet Union and weaken the nonaligned and 
anti-Soviet position held by many in the Tehran regime. The United States 
should make every effort to establish contracts with receptive elements in 
the Iranian leadership. They argue that such elements could influence a 
change in the Khomeini regime's continued refusal to negotiate an end to the 
6-year-old conflict. Links with moderate factions could serve as a hedge 
against Soviet designs on Irac, particularly when the time comes for a 
successor to Ayatollah Khomeini. In this sense, the renewal of 3.S.-Iraqi 
relations has served no useful purpose. 
Others Contend that there is no apparent visible role for the United 
States to play in the conflict; with limited leverage on either side, the 
United States should remain on the sidelines. Direct U.S. aid to Iraq would 
only give Iran more reason to prolong the war. The costs of potential U.S. 
involvement would be high. In any case, the current military stalemate, 
which drains the energies and resources of both the Tehran and Baghdad 
regimes, serves U.S. interests and prevents either of them from threatening 
the Gulf Arab states through military aggression or subversion. The Husayn 
regime in Baghdad is no better than the Khomeini regime in Tehran. On the 
one hand, Iraq has used chemical weapons against Iranian troops. On the 
other, Iran has sent waves of children to clear minefields, has refused 
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permission ot the International Red Cross to visit Iraqi prisoners-of-war, 
many of whom reportedly have been subjected to psychological pressure and 
execution. Iran reportedly has used chemical weapons against its Kurdish 
dissiclents. U.S. involvement could jeopardize delicate mediation efforts 
designed to bring the two belligerents to the bargaining table, and could 
lead to escalation of the war. 
Since April 1984, the escalation of the air war against shipping in the 
Gulf and U.S. reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers has generated debate over U.S. 
military involvement in the region. [See CRS Issue Brief 87145, The Persian 
Gulf and the U.S. Naval Presence: Issues for Congress.] Some caution that 
the mission of U.S. forces must be clearly defined, together with the 
development of a plan and force structure capable of achieving precisely 
determined goals. In any event, any U.S. intervention will face the risk of 
appearing to take one side or another. 
The Iran-Iraq Conflict 
War of Attrition 
To date, the Iran-Iraq war has become a war of attrition -- a static 
conflict since mid-1982 in which the line of battle has not moved more than a 
few miles from the common border. The pattern of operations in general has 
become one of periodic Iranian offensives, launched partly in the hope of 
breaking through Iraqi lines and partly to wear down the Iraqi forces. 
Tactically, the Iranians have persisted in attacking, using massed infantry, 
but battles have not been fought to decisive conclusions, in large measure 
because the Iranians have lacked the equipment and spare parts, firepower, 
and logistical support to achieve effectively their objectives or to exploit 
breakthroughs. Neither side has made optimal use of weapons essential.for a 
war of maneuver. 
Since June 9 ,  1985, Iranian ground operations generally have taken the 
form of rapid, small-scale attacks against the Iraqi lines in all three 
sectors of the 780-mile front. Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani stated at the time 
that Iran's intent was "to achieve victory with as few casualties as 
possible;" and Pasdaran Chief of Staff Ali Reza Afshur asserted on June 23 
that Khomeini has issued Ifan overall order for a defensive holy war." 
In early February 1986, Iraqi units repulsed Iranian attacks in the 
marshlands north of Basra. On Feb. 10, Iranian forces crossed the Shatt 
al-Arab southeast of Basra and succeeded in occupying the Iraqi port of 
Al-Faw. Tehran increased pressure on Iraq by opening an attack on Feb. 24 in 
the northern sector, in conjunction with dissident Iraqi Kurds and exiled 
Shiite units. The apparent objective was to tie down Iraqi forces in the 
northern and southern extremi'ties of the front, thereby making Iraq more 
vulnerable to a full-scale offensive north of Basra. Following a massive 
buildup of Iranian troops in the Susangerd area, Baghdad has been 
anticipating an imminent large-scale attack in the central sector. On April 
30, Iraqi ground forces struck across the Iranian border in the sector in an 
effort to disrupt Iranian concentrations. In May Iraqi forces captured the 
border town of Mehran, only to be driven back after six weeks. During the 
night of Aug. 31, Iranian forces attacked in the Haj Omran area in 
mountainous terrain; both sides claimed to have inflicted heavy losses on the 
other. On Sept. 11, Iraq reported its forces had repulsed an Iranian 
amphibious attack in marshlands in the southern sector. Iran launched a 
sizeable attack across the Shatt al-Arab on Dec. 24 that was thrown back with 
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considerable losses after heavy fighting. 
On Jan. 6, 1987, Iranian forces conducted a large-scale, 3-pkonged attack 
against Iraqi defense lines protecting the eastern approach'es to Basra, 
advancing up the east side of the Shatt al-Arab to within 6 miles of the 
city. In early February, a series of Iraqi counterattacks appe,ared to have 
succeeded in recovering some lost territory. Casualty estimates placed 
Iranian losses at 50,000, and Iraqi at about 20,000. In the central sector, 
Iran launched a "limited operationw north of Sumar, cla<ming to have 
recaptured territory seized by Iraq in 1980. Iran renewed its attacks near 
Basra on February 23. 
In the air, the Iraqi air force, with increasing frequency, has struck at 
Iranian economic and industrial targets throughout 1986 and inta 1987. With 
the new round of ground fighting, both sides have resumed air, missile, and 
artillery attacks on the other's population centers. Baghdad declared a halt 
in air attacks on Iranian cities on February 19, but on February 23, 
threatened to renew the raids because of Iranian attacks and shelling near 
Basra. 
A feature of the recent Iranian offensives is that the Iranian air force 
has been more in evidence, and Iran has improved its air defense systems. 
Some observers consider that shipments of U.S. arms and spare parts have 
contributed to an improved Iranian performance. 
A number of observers consider that the Iranian leadership, armed with the 
knowledge that it cannot lose the war militarily and having conditioned its 
economy, its people and its foreign policy to the concept of a prolonged 
conflict, has decided to continue the war of attrition in order to bring down 
the Iraqi regime of Saddam Husayn. While the war has impinged strongly on 
Iranian national life and casualities have been heavy, fighting has taken 
place at a distance from the principal cities. The stepping up of Iraqi air 
attacks on population centers in early 1985, including Tehran, reportedly had 
succeeded in prompting some limited anti-war demonstrations within Iran. 
Iran continues to finance its war effort through petroleum exports which 
have ranged between 1.6 million and 2.3 million barrels per day except for 
periodic drops as a result of Iraqi air attacks against tankers and Iranian 
oil terminals. Tehran continues to reject all attempts at mediation and 
negotiations for a settlement of the conflict. Iraq, on the other hand, has 
faced economic difficulties with its primary oil export terminals having been 
destroyed early in the war, its trans-Syrian pipeline cut off because of 
Syria's support for Iran and its hostility toward the Bahgdad regime, and its 
remaining pipeline through Turkey facilitating some 1 million barrels per 
day. Since September 1985, between 300,000 and 500,000 b/d has been exported 
through the Saudi port of Yanbu, and some 100,OO.O b/d is trucked to Agaba, 
Jordan, and through Turkey. The current slump in world oil prices has 
compounded the problems facing the Iraqi economy, including 1986 repayment 
deadlines for deferred debts to overseas creditors. Some economists estimate 
that Baghdad will require $4 billion to $8 billion to meet its current 
account deficit in 1986. Such figures do not include the costs of the 
conflict (estimated at $600 million-$1 billion per month) that are partly 
being met by Gulf Arab oil-producing states. With a population of only a 
third of its adversary, Iraq faces greater difficulties than Iran in 
sustaining the heavy casualties of a war of attrition, and it has expressed 
its willingness to join mediation efforts to end the conflict. 
Iraqi President Husayn, on Aug. 3 ,  1986, issued an open letter to Iranian 
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leaders calling for a mutual withdrawal from occupied territories, an 
agreement not to interfere in the other's internal affairs, and a full 
exchange of prisoners. On Aug. 7 ,  Ayatalloh Khomeini rejected the plea, 
stating that peace with Iraq now would be "contrary toi Islamw and "compromise 
would be worse than war." At the same time, Iranian news media reported the 
movement of the thousands of fresh troops to the front in preparation for a 
new offensive. Khomeini, on Feb. 10, 1987, declared that Iran was engaged in 
"a divine causen which would not cease until final victory. 
B. The Air War in the Gulf. Since Aug. 12, 1982, when Iraqi President 
Husayn declared a maritime exclusion zone in the northern Gulf, the Iraqi air 
force has been increasingly active in attacking shipping and oil 
installations in that zone. 
Iraq's objectives are to prevent or reduce the importation of vital 
materials required by Iran for its war effort and to reduce or terminate 
Iran's financial means to conduct war through its oil exports. It should be 
noted that until Mar. 27, 1984, Iraq had refrained from striking the Kharg 
Island terminal, which handled some 90% of Iran's oil exports. Iraqi Foreign 
Minister Aziz reiterated on May 19 his government's intention of continuing 
to interdict shipping to and from Kharg Island and Iran's northern ports, 
emphasizing Iraq's objective of demonstrating to the Tehran regime that "the 
elusive war of attrition which they bet on is not in their interest." 
Iraq continued its pattern of periodic attacks on shipping within the 
exclusion zone throughout 1985, 1986, and into 1987. In addition, Iraqi 
aircraft made frequent attacks on pumping stations at Gurreh and Ganaveh 
supplying Kharq Island. In July 1985 Baghdad claimed to have carried . o u t  
successful raids against Iranian offshore oil fields. On August 15, several 
Iraqi aircraft effectively damaged the T-junction loading pier on the east 
side of Kharg Island. Iraq continued its raids on Kharg into October. On 
Sept. 18, the Sea Island loading pier on the east side of Kharg sustained 
heavy damage, thereby temporarily lessening Iran's capabilities to export 
Oil. 
Iran's response since mid-May 1984 has been to attack shipping sailing 
from Saudi and other Arab ports in the Western Gulf and to stop and search 
shipping entering the Gulf and, in some cases, confiscating cargoes reputedly 
bound for Iraq. 
The cumulative effects of Iraq's gradually escalating air strategy in the 
northern Gulf have been threefold: an inhibition upon shipowners and oil 
traders from sailing to northern waters; a rise in marine insurance rates; 
and increases in spot oil prices. To offset future suspensions of shipments 
from the Kharg Island terminal, the Iranian Oil Ministry has been loading 
crude from its Lavan Islarid terminal (150,000 b/d capacity) and supertankers 
anchored off Sirri Island, near the Strait of Hormuz, replenished by shuttle 
tankers from Kharg. In late June 1986, Iran opened new floating terminals 
off Hengam and Earak islands at the Strait of Hormuz. 
On Aug. 12, 1986, Iraqi Mirage F-1 strike aircraft, armed with 
laser-guided AS-30 air-to-surface missiles and using in-flight refueling, hit 
five tankers off Sirri Island in an attack regarded by some observers as a 
significant escalation of the conflict. Facilities at Lavan Island were 
attacked on Sept. 5. On Nov. 26, Iraq attacked the Larak island transhipment 
terminal. [For recent developments in the Gulf air war, see CRS Issue Brief 
87207, The Persian Gulf and the War Powers Debate: Issue Summary and Review 
of Events.] 
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C. Mediation Efforts. Since the beginning of the conflict in September 
1980, there have been several mediation efforts designed to achieve an end to 
the war on the part of international and regional organizations as well as 
individual countries. All such efforts have failed because of Iran's 
insistence that any resolution to the conflict must contain the following 
conditions: the unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Iranian 
territory; the convening of an international tribunal to determine the 
aggressor; the payment of war reparations (placed by Ayatollah Khomeini at 
$150 billion); the return of some 100,000 Shi'ites expelled by Iraq; and the 
overthrow of Iraqi President Husayn and his leadership. Many observers 
consider that a negotiated settlement is unlikely so long as Ayatollah 
Khomeini, who continues to insist on Iraqi President Husayn's removal from 
office, retains power. Recent statements by Iranian leaders, however, 
indicate differences as to the conduct of the war and a possible shift by 
some away from earlier maximalist positions. Iraq has expressed its 
willingness to accept a negotiated settlement under the following conditions: 
a return to international borders; an exchange of prisoners; a non-aggression 
pact; and an agreement not to interfere in each country's internal affairs. 
I. Chemical Weapons. Between May 1981 and March 1984, Iran claimed that 
Iraq employed chemical weapons against its forces 49 times. (The use of 
chemical weapons was banned under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, to which both 
Iran and Iraq are signatories.) The U.S. State Department on Mar. 5, 1984, 
asserted the United States had concluded that "available evidence" indicated 
"lethal chemical weapons'' had been used by Iraq during the February fighting 
that were "inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations." 
On Mar. 26, 1984, an investigation by an international team of medical and 
military specialists undertaken in Iran earlier in March at the request of 
U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar in response to Iranian 
charges of Iraqi use of chemical weapons, concluded -- without suggesting the 
origin -- that mustard gas ( b i s - ( 2 - ~ h l o r 0 e t h y l ) - s ~ l f i d e )  and a nerve agent 
known as Tabun (ethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate) had been employed. 
The extent to which the chemical agents had been used, however, could not be 
determined. No evidence was found of the presence of mycotoxin. 
Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani announced on Mar. 23, .L984, that Iran was 
committed not to use chemical weapons, but he stated that it possessed the 
capability for manufacturing them. On Mar. 27, Iranian Ambassador to the 
United Nations Said Rajai-Khjorassani warned that if the Security Council 
took no action against Iraq for its use of such weapons, Iran would then be 
encouraged to resort to chemical warfare in retaliation, "should we find we 
have no other means to stop the ememy." On Mar. 30, the Security Council 
"stronglyn condemned the use of chemical weapons, but did not name Iraq as 
the guilty party. 
State Department spokesman John Hughes announced on Mar. 30, 1984, the 
imposition of regulations restricting the export of chemicals to both Iran 
and Iraq that could be used in the production of chemical weapons. On Apr. 
9, 1984 five West European nations -- West Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands -- agreed to restrict the export of 
substances to Iran and Iraq that could be used to produce chemical weapons. 
In April 1985, U.S. intelligence sources, monitoring world markets in the 
sale of such substances, reportedly concluded that both Iraq and Iran were 
continuing to purchase the chemicals despite the restrictions. 
Tehran again charged that Iraq used lethal chemical weapons against its 
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forces during the March 1985 offensive. Secretary of State Shultz condemned 
the use of chemical weapons during a meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz 
on March 25. Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati claimed on Apr. 16 
that between Mar. 3 and Apr. 9 ,  there were 33 Iraqi chemical attacks in which 
4,000 Iranians were killed or injured. Velayati was critical over the 
failure of the United Nations to take action against Iraq for using chemical 
weapons, and he asserted that Iran had the capability to retaliate. The 
State Department on Apr. 24 expressed concern that Iran may have developed an 
arsenal of chemical weapons for use against Iraq. 
During the February 1986 Iranian offensive in the Al-Faw Peninsula, Tehran 
accused Iraq of having used chemical weapons and stated that more than 8,000 
of its troops had been affected. The State Department on Feb. 19 condemned 
Iraq's use of chemical weapons. U.N. Secretary General de Cuellar on Mar. 14 
released an investigation team's report naming, for the first time, Iraq's 
use of mustard gas and nerve gas, and on Mar. 21, the U.N. Security Council 
condemned the continued use of chemical weapons by Iraq. On July 15, a 
British representative at the Conference on Disarmament in Gen'eva charged 
that Iraqi chemical weapons were responsible for about 10,000 casualties and 
stated that Iraq appeared to be increasing its capabilities to produce 
chemical weapons. 
On Jan. 7, 1987, Iran claimed to have hit an Iraqi chemical weapons depot 
on the western bank of the Shatt al-Arab, during an artillery barage, 
releasing a cloud of toxic gas that caused several hundred Iraqi casualties. 
The Iranian media also quoted an Iranian official as stating that Iran can 
now produce its own chemical weapons and may use them against Iraq. On Feb. 
23, Tehran claimed Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iranian forces near 
Basra, but chemical warfare units had "neutralized the impact of the toxic 
gasses." 
111. Future Trends in the Iran-Iraq'war 
Iraqi air attacks on Gulf shipping and Iranian threats to blockade the 
Gulf have indicated a large element of psychological warfare between the two 
belligerents. Iraq currently possesses a-quantitative and qualitative edge 
over Iran in modern weapons, particularly in aircraft, armor, anC artillery. 
But prevailing demographic and economic imbalances ultimately appear to favor 
Iran. Iran's stated messianic and expansionist goals indicate the present 
Tehran regime's ambitions to play a major role in the region. 
A 1985 Economist Intelligence Unit study considered the probability 
likelihood of four scenarios for an end to the conflict: escalation of 
warfare (10%) ; a continuing war of attrition (40%) ; no war, no peace (40%) ; 
and a collapse of Iraq (102). The authors suggested that damage inflicted by 
war was such that even an early settlement would have Iraq needing 10 years 
to complete reconstruction, and Iran 20 years. They emphasized that both 
combatants will be dependent on oil revenues for some time to come, and the 
importance of Iran's "ultimate weapon," its numerically superior population. 
They warned against underestimating the motives and forces that produced the 
Iranian revolution and upon which Ayatollah Khomeini can still draw. 
The Iraqi economy faces increasing difficulties should the current war of 
attrition prevail. Oil revenues, once in excess of $20 billion per year, 
have fallen between $5.3 and $8 billion. Iraq is dependent on subsidies from 
other Arab oil-producers in order to maintain its war effort. Baghdad is 
confronted with difficult choices in economic priorities as resources and 
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manpower are expended in the conflict. The capacity of Iraq to prosecute the 
war has been severely curtailed by the fall in international oil prices 
despite its increased export capabilities. At the beginning of 1986, the 
Iraqi government appeared to have succeeded in organizing the economy to cope 
with development priorities, as well as the war. By mid-1986, development 
seems to have taken a back seat. Iraq presently is squeezed more tightly by 
acute shortages of foreign exchange, and it continues to request its 
suppliers to agree to further debt rescheduling. 
Experience gained and lessons learned from the war have improved the 
quality and operations of the Iraqi armed forces, and there appears to have 
been significant modification in the command and control structure. With the 
acquisition of large quantities of modern military weapons systems and 
equipment, difficulties remain with the technological assimilation in certain 
areas and the optimal use of sophisticated systems. The morale factor in the 
armed forces continues to be of extreme importance. 
A "massive1' Iranian general mobilization plan began in October 1985 in 
preparation for a "final offensive." Special operations forces units 
reportedly have been deployed along the front, thereby indicating the 
possible utilization of new tactics. Several hundred thousand volunteers and 
conscripts, including civil servants and professionals, were added to the 
ranks of the Islamic Republic of Iran Guards Corps (IRIGC -- Pasdaran) and 
Basij (militia) units, with large numbers dispatched to the front. The 
Supreme Defense Council, comprising of senior religious, political and 
military leaders, was bolstered and charged with coordinating war policy, 
including mobilization and training. Government departments, nationalized 
bazks and industries, and other affiliated organizations were requested in 
late June 1986 to place staffs and resources at the disposal of the IRIGC. 
In August 1986, Prime Minister Musavi issued guidelines for transforming the 
Iranian economy following a cabinet review. The war effort occupied first 
priority in the official guidelines, with emphasis upon a successful 
conclusion of the Iran-Iraq conflict before March 1987. Some observers 
suggest that Iran needs results quickly. There have been reports of 
differences within the top levels of Iran's leadership over the conduct of 
the war, external mediation efforts, and negotiations for a settlement of the 
conflict. The IRIGC reportedly has been receiving the bulk of new equipment 
to the resentment of the regular armed forces. A large-scale l'f inai 
offensive," possibly through a sequence of attacks along the entire front, is 
expected at any time with the objective of breaking the Iraqi armed forces. 
The initial success of Iranian tactics employed in operations in late 1986 
and early 1987 indicate that Tehran has found a key to breaking through 
seemingly impregnable Iraqi barriers. Amphibious assault appears to have 
become something of an Iranian specialty. 
Some observers consider a likely Iranian objective to be the isolation or 
capture of Basra and the establishment of a revolutionary Shi'ite regime on 
Iraqi soil,. Once COnS~lidated, Iranian forces would advance to take the 
shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala. Others question Iranian capabilities, 
however, to exploit and sustain an advance in light of Iran's limited 
materiel and logistical resources. 
An Iranian attempt to block the Gulf is Considered manageable provided 
that prompt and effective action is taken to protect shipping and secure the 
Strait. Destruction of oil installations at selected locations in the Gulf 
region, on the other hand, carries potentially critical dangers for Western 
interests. Western Europe and Japan would be more directly and immediately 
affected. The protection of Gulf oil fields and installations, because of 
their widespread locations and areal extent, would strain available U.S. and 
allied assets. 
While a negotiated settlement appears unlikely in the near-term, 
indefinite prolongation of the conflict is not necessarily a foregone 
conclusion. A number of ongoing factors could combine to undermine the 
political will to prosecute the war. Increased psychological attrition 
within the Iraqi political and military leaderships could result in major 
changes. The effects of the oil price decline on the acquisition of military 
equipment and on the domestic economy are increasingly felt by both sides. 
There are indications of growing war-weariness in both Iran and Iraq. Some 
observers suggest that dwindling resources and the war eventually could 
create circumstances for a slowdown in hostilities, a de facto cease-fire, 
and, eventually, an armistice. 
IV. Soviet Interests and Involvement in Iran and Iraq 
A leading U.S. policy concern is that the Iran-Iraq conflict will open 
opportunities for Soviet exploitation, thereby enabling Moscow to enhance its 
position vis-a-vis the United States in the Gulf region. The nature of the 
Soviet threat, however, is subject to wide-ranging debate and, since the 
change of leadership in Moscow, new patterns of Soviet policy are emerging. 
While Moscow has tended to avoid large risks in the Middle East during the 
recent past, nevertheless it continues to perceive that it has important and 
legitimate interests in the region. 
For the Soviet Union, the Persian Gulf lies proximate to its southern 
border and Moscow, as it seeks to increase its influence among regional 
countries, cannot remain indifferent to political and military developments 
in the region. Former Soviet Chairman Leonid Brezhnev acknowledged that the 
Gulf was an area of vital Western interests on Dec. 10, 1980, in New Delhi 
when he proposed a multilateral agreement for the demilitarization and 
neutralization of the Gulf region. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union continues 
to oppose all U.S. efforts to defend those interests through the 
establishment of a military presence in the Gulf/Indian Ocean region. 
Moscow faces constraints to any policy initiative aimed at exploiting 
opportunities arising from the Iran-Iraq war. Because of Iran's size, 
location, population, and common border with the U.S.S.R., the Soviets 
perceive Iran as strategically more important than Iraq. Since the Iranian 
revolution, Moscow has aimed at normalizing and improving its political and 
economic relations with Tehran. But it has avoided any overwhelming 
commitment toward supporting Iran lest its ties with Iraq and its standing in 
other parts of the Arab world be eroded. Soviet neutrality in the conflict, 
in consequence, has been translated into maintaining a controlled supply of 
arms to both sides. 
Soviet relations with Iraq had been good until the mid-1970s when they 
began to sour, despite a 1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Iraq 
subsequently started to diversify its sources of arms and imported Western -- 
including American -- technology and equipment. During the first two years 
of the Iran-Iraq conflict, Moscow was cool to Iraqi requests for additional 
supplies of military equipment and spare parts. Iraq responded by executing 
or exiling members of the Iraqi Communist Party, and was openly critical of 
Soviet interference and actions in the Middle East, particularly its invasion 
of Afghanistan. At the same time, increased trade and other ties between 
Iran and the Soviet Union were largely induced by Iranian dependence on 
Soviet transit routes following the Iraqi capture of Iran's largest port at 
Khorramshahr. Iran's considerable economic difficulties led to barter 
arrangements with East European countries and to an influx of large numbers 
of Soviet and Eastern bloc exports and. advisers. 
Despite the intense anti-Americanism of the Iranian regime, Soviet 
influence does not predominate in Tehran. In fact, the Iranian regime 
presently continues to identify the Soviet Union as another manifestation of 
the "satanic forcesw with which its revolution is struggling in eternal 
conflict. Iran's mistrust of the Soviet Union is bolstered by historical 
experience and by the Tehran regime's policy of nonalignment. In addition, 
Iran opposes the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and aids the resistance 
forces. 
Relations with Moscow took a turn for the worse in May 1983 with the 
expulsion of several Soviet diplomats and Tehran's proscription of the 
communist Tudeh Party and two smaller pro-Soviet groups. The Iraqis were 
reinforced with new deliveries of Soviet military equipment, including -- 
according to newsmedia reports -- MIG-25 and MIG-27 aircraft, Mi-24 
helicopter gunships, new supplies of ground-to-ground missiles, and T-72 
tanks. Iranian President Ali Khamenei warned the Soviet Union on Oct. 7 I 
1983, against its continuing to supply arms to Iraq. On Jan. 14, 1984, 
Moscow gave notice that Tehran's continued hostility would be certain to harm 
Soviet-Iranian trade relations. Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani on Feb. 26 called 
upon the Soviet Union to end its supply of arms and missiles to Iraq "before 
it is too late." Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, during his 
visit to Japan in April 1984, stressed the Soviet threat and emphasized that 
Iran served as a barrier to Soviet expansion in the Middle East. He stated 
that while faith in God still formed a common ground between Iran and the 
United States, the Soviet Union, where there was no faith in God, could not 
be trusted at all. On June 6, however, the Political Director General of the 
Iranian Foreign Ministry, Sayyid Muhammad Sadr, held discussions in Moscow 
with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and other Soviet officials on the war 
and economic relations. Moscow informed visiting Iranian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Hossein Kazempur-Ardebili in early April 1985 that it desired a 
negotiated resolution of the conflict. This message was repeated to visiting 
Iranian officials in July 1986. 
Recent Iranian's efforts to improve ties with Moscow reflect political and 
military considerations as well as economic needs. Discussions in Moscow 
between Soviet officials an8 Iranian Oil Minister Qolam Reza Aqazadeh-Khol in 
August 1986 resulted in agreement to resume natural gas supplies to the 
Soviet Union. Moscow subsequently ha,s agreed to support the Aug. 5, 1986, 
OPEC agreement and cut its oil exports. 
Medium- and long-term economic cooperation talks between Iraq and the 
Soviet Union were conducted in March 1984; and on Mar. 7, the Soviet 
Atomenergoexport was appointed by Baghdad to identify a site for a planned 
nuclear station. In April, there were growing indications that Moscow was 
stepping up military aid to Iraq against an anticipated Iranian offensive. 
Iraqi President Husayn in early May characterized Iraq-Soviet relations as 
"good," stating his government was "interested in developing this and so are 
the Soviets.w In late August 1986, Soviet Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister 
Vladimir Petrovsky met with President Husayn in Baghdad and reiterated Soviet 
support for Iraq's efforts to end the conflict. 
The ability of Moscow to influence a post-Khomeini regime in Iran remains 
of considerable concern to U.S. planners in light of the absence of U.S. 
influence in Tehran and the present lack of alternative political leadership 
groups to the Islamic Republican Party. Reportedly, the Soviets are 
continuing to supply military equipment to Iran in an apparent move to 
maintain their options in the event of a change of leadership in Tehran. 
Moscow also harbors concern over the Iranian revolution's possible future 
influence on Soviet Muslims who number close to 50 million. 
Regional Effects of the Conflict 
Of particular concern to the United States is the potential for a widening 
of the conflict that could increase prospects for destabilizing the region 
and endanger U.S. interests. From the beginning, the Iran-Iraq war created. 
realignments among Arab states and deepened existing cleavages in the Arab 
world. Indeed, it almost led to armed confrontation between Syria and Jordan 
in late 1980. 
Jordan was the most vociferous Arab state in support of Iraq and that 
support took a number of forms, including political advocacy, the opening of 
its port at Aqaba for unloading supplies destined for Iraq, .and volunteers to 
serve alongside Iraqi forces. 
Syria, in contrast, has effectively supported Iran because of its 
hostility toward the Baghdad regime, reflected in its condemnation of Iraqi 
military moves against Iran. Syrian motives were interpreted as being 
another manifestation of the rivalry between the two Ba'athist regimes in 
Damascus and Baghdad over the leadership of the Ba'ath and the Arab world. 
In addition, the ruling Alawite elite in Damascus are members of a minority 
sect in Syria that is an offshoot of Shi'ism. In late 1985 and early 1986, 
there were signs of deteriorating relations between Iraq and Syria. Attempts 
by Jordanian King Husayn to normalize ties between Baghdad and Damascus in 
1986 have thus far lacked suecess, however. 
The reaction of other Arab states to the conflict fell between the 
Jordanian and Syrian positions. The Gulf Arab states have lent financial 
support to Iraq (an estimated $30+ billion) in its conduct of the war. Iran 
repeatedly has countered with strong warnings in efforts to intimidate Gulf 
countries and, in its Arabic broadcasts, has called for the overthrow of 
ruling regimes. The formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in May 
1981 in large measure was catalyzed by the perceived Iranian threat to the 
region. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
and Oman formed the organization as an economic, internal security 
cooperation and defense arrangement. GCC concern for the Iranian threat was 
reinforced by an abortive coup in December 1981 in Bahrain organized by 
Iranian-trained and supplied members of the Islamic Front for the Liberation 
of .Bahrain. Reaction by GCC member-states to the coup attempt was a decisive 
increase in regional diplomatic and economic Support for Iraq. 
For the Gulf states, the position of continuing to support Iraq 
economically and diplomatically could invite Iranian retaliation against oil 
and military installations. (Kuwait has charged that, between 1981 and 1983, 
Iranian aircraft have attacked its oil installations on three occasions. In 
1986, sabotage damaged Kuwaiti oil facitilies.) Since May 1982, the GCC has 
looked to ways for ending the conflict while seeking to strengthen its 
security arrangements. At a summit meeting in Qatar in November 1983, the 
GCC examined options to bolster security of member states and Gulf sea lanes, 
as well as to find an end to the war. In March and April 1984, there were 
indications of a growing conviction among GCC leaders that the war was on the 
verge of becoming a wider conflict threatening regional stability. Following 
Iranian air attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers in mid-May 1984, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia placed their air defenses on a heightened state of alert. At an 
emergency meeting of GCC foreign ministers in Riyadh on May 17, Iran was 
condemned for its l1aggressions" against their "vital interests." The GCC 
called for an emergency session of the Arab League on May 20 "to adopt a 
unified Arab stand," and raised the issue in the U.N. Security Council. 
(Resolution 522 of June 1, 1984, reaffirmed the right of free navigation to 
all ports and and installations of Gulf states not party to the conflict, and 
condemned Iranian attacks on commercial shipping.) While seeking 
international support, the GCC will face final decisions on self defense 
should Iranian attacks escalate to a highe'r level. GCC interest in a 
near-term conclusion to the conflict appears to be motivated by economic and 
security concerns. 
The so-called Steadfastness Front -- Syria, Libya, Algeria, the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) -- met on May 24, 1982, in Algiers to proclaim that Iran was a friend 
of the Arabs and to urge that no Arab state help Iraq. While this group 
officially declared support for Iran, the level of support has varied from 
Syria's outright condemnation of Iraq to the more neutral and mediative 
efforts of the PLO and Algeria. 
Arab League foreign ministers (with the exception of Syria and Libya) met 
in an emergency session in Baghdad in mid-March 1984 and issued a 
condemnation of Iran's "continuous aggression and its attempts to cross 
international borders and occupy Iraq's territories." They urged Iran to 
abide by resolutions calling for an end to hostilities and to accept 
mediation initiatives to end the conflict. 
Despite its isolation resulting from the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, 
Egypt has been considered in some Arab circles as a counterweight to Iran 
because of its size of population and comparative military strength. Iraqi 
President Husayn in May 1982 invited Egyptian President Muhammad Mubarak to 
send troops. Egypt, since 1981, had been contributing arms and ammunition to 
Iraq. Mubarak declined to dispatch Egyptian forces. But relations between 
the two countries have drawn closer. Iraqi military missions have visited 
Cairo since 1982. Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali stated on Mar. 
26, 1984, at the conclusion of a visit to Baghdad that his government fully 
supported Iraq and would not hesitate to offer any military aid requested. 
Iraqi President Husayn on May 3 called for Egypt's return to the Arab league. 
President Mubarak visited Baghdad in March 1985 as a gesture of support for 
Iraq. Since mid-1986, Egypt reportedly has stepped up shipments of spare 
parts and military advisers to Iraq. 
Turkey has maintained a neutral stance toward the conflict since its 
inception. When Iran launched its offensive at the border of northern Iraq 
in July 1983, the Turkish government issued a strong warning to Tehran that 
no action should be taken that would be contrary to Turkey's national 
interests, and it expressed the hope that its position would be well 
understood by Iran. Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati responded by 
stating that Turkey should not be concerned about the destruction of the 
Kirkuk-Iskenderun oil pipeline, which is a significant source of income for 
Turkey. The Turks have taken strong security measures to protect the 
pipeline inside their territory. They also have been concerned over Iranian 
exploitation of dissident Iraqi Kurdish elements. In May 1983, October 1984, 
and August 1986, Turkish military forces launched raids against Kurdish 
rebels inside Iraqi territory, apparently with Iraqi acquiescence. In 
November 1984, Turkey announced agreement with Iran over the prevention of 
activities in each other's territory that would endanger either's security. 
But, on Aug. 27, 1986, Turkish Foreign Minister Vahir Halefoglu reportedly 
warned that any Iranian victory resulting in the overthrow of Saddam Husayn 
would prompt Turkish seizure of the Mosul and Kirkuk regions in northern Iraq 
which produce a substantial proportion of Iraqi oil. He stated Turkey's 
security interests were such that it could not tolerate an Iranian satellite 
regime as a neighbor that would manipulate the rebellious Kurds. 
VI. Evolution of U.S. Policy toward the Iran-Iraq Conflict. 
Until the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Baghdad on Nov. 26, 
1984, official U.S. relations with Iran and Iraq had been limited. Iraq had 
severed diplomatic relations with the United States during the 1967 
Arab-Israeli war, but both countries had maintained interest sections in each 
other's capitals. It is unlikely that renewed official ties will increase 
U.S. leverage over Baghdad. The United States broke relations with Iran in 
April 1980 following the seizure of the American Embassy and its occupants in 
Tehran the previous November. Iran's intense anti-Americanism -- a central 
factor in that country's internal political dynamics since its revolution in 
1979 -- precludes the likelihood of a reestablishment of U.S.Iranian ties so 
long as the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) under Ayatollah Khomeini retains 
power. 
Since mid-1983, U.S. official contacts with Baghdad have increased and led 
credence to a ntiltw toward Iraq in U.S. policy. On May 21, 1984, the State 
Department specifically condemned wIranian intransigencew as the main 
obstacle to an end to the Iran-Iraq conflict. And, on May 31, President 
Reagan in an interview in London noted that Iraq had confined its attacks 
against shipping in the Gulf whereas Iran had attacked ships belonging to 
neutral nations, and stated that "in time of war, the enemy's commerce and 
trade is a fair target if you can hurt them economically. So, in that sense, 
Iraq has not gone beyond bounds, as Iran has done." 
Significantly, there continues to exist an antipathy between Washington 
and Tehran as a result of Iranian-inspired Shi'ite terrorist efforts against 
U.S. pers-wnnel and installations in the Middle East. President Reagan on 
July 8, 1985, denounced Iran as a terrorist country. 
A National Security Council study of October 1983 reportedly had concluded 
that U.S. interests would not be served if Iraq were to collapse. At the 
same time, it maintained that there was little the United States could do to 
aid I-raq directly. Iraq's primary needs, in order to sustain its ability to 
continue the war, were economic assistance and improvement in the morale of 
its officer corps. As a result of the study, the Administration reportedly 
encouraged Gulf Arab states to increase financial support for Iraq and 
conducted efforts aimed at limiting the flow of arms from third countries to 
Iran. 
Iraq was removed from the list of countries supporting international 
terrorism in 1982, thereby facilitating sales of certain items of equipment 
formerly under restriction. In December 1982, a sale of some 60 civilian 
Hughes helicopters to Baghdad was reported. Iraq has been granted credit 
guarantees to finance sales of U.S. farm products since December 1982. 
Since the hostage cri'sis, Washington has placed restrictions on trade 
between the United States and Iran, with the exception of food products ane 
medical equipment. Nevertheless, newsmedia reports indicate that trade has 
increased, mainly on the basis of American firms trading through their 
overseas affiliates with Iranian organizations. But, on Jan. 23, 1984, the 
State Department adaed Iran to the list of countries reportedly supporting 
acts of international terrorism. A substantial illegal traffic in U.S. arms 
reportedly has developed in which American weapons and spare parts that have 
been forwarded to Iran by a variety of routes. Iraqi officials in 1983 have 
claimed that Iran consistently has been receiving large quantities of U.S. 
weaponry through non-official sources aond third countries, including South 
Korea and Israel, without interference from Washington. Iraqi Deputy Prime 
Minister Ramadan stated in February 1984 that he welcomed indications of !*a 
more positive attitude*! by the United States toward the matter. The State 
Department in March 1984 designated Ambassador-at-large Richard Fairbanks to 
coordinate U.S. efforts in limiting arms deliveries to Iran from Western 
Europe, Israel and friendly Asian states. Such efforts reportedly had been 
partly successful in reducing the flow of spare parts and equipment. U.S. 
concern in August 1986 that Iran might gain the strategic initiative and 
psychological advantage in the Conflict reportedly has heightened Americas 
diplomatic efforts aimed at reducing international arms deliveries to Iran. 
Within the United States, shipments of replacement parts for U.S. equipment 
destined for Iran from American firms have been seized. Since 1984, more 
than 70 persons have been arrested by U.S. authorities. 
Following the Iranian attack on the Al-Faw Peninsula in early 1986, a 
State Department spokesman warned Iran that an expansion of the conflict 
elsewhere in the Gulf regions would be a major threat to U.S. interests, 
noting that Iran had openly been conducting a campaign to int~zidate moderate 
Gulf Arab states. Secretary of State Schultz stated on Aug. 8, 1986, that 
the United States and the Soviet Union, in prelirr,inary talks for the 
forthcoming summit meeting, had begun discussing cooperative action toward 
hastening the end of the Iran-Iraq conflict. 
With the revelation in November 1986 of secret negotiations between 
representatives of the Reagan Administration and the Iranian government, 
controversy has arisen over specific and broader policy objectives underlying 
the U.S initiative. On Nov. 13, President Reagan acknowledged an 18-month 
effort to establish contacts with "moderatew elements in Iran with the 
declared objectives of: (1) restoring relations with a strategically 
significant Gulf State; (2) seeking an honorable end to the Iran-Iraq 
conflict; (3) eliminating state-sponsored terrorism in the region; and (4) 
securing the release of American hostages held in Lebanon by pro-Iranian 
Shi'ite groups. The initiative reflected a reappraisal of U.S. policy toward 
Iran that began in late 1984 but which received less than whole-hearted 
support within the executive branch. The subsequent covert arms sales to 
Iran, in conjunction with Israel and private parties, by elements in the 
National Security Council violated the official U.S. position of neutrality 
in the Iran-Iraq war and contradicted U.S. policy toward terrorism. Many 
observers contend that the initiative had damaged severely U.S. credibility 
among allies and friendly regional states. (See Arms Shipments to Iran [by] 
Richard M. Preece. [washington] (periodically updated). CRS Issue Brief 
87022.) 
